The zones and conduits have been drawn; now management is asking “how secure should this zone be?”. IEC 62443-3-3 gives a measurable answer to this question in terms of security levels (SL) and seven foundational requirements. Below, we describe the distinction between SL-T, SL-C and SL-A, how to read the standard’s requirement structure, how to set the target level for a zone and how to carry out a gap analysis against the existing system, together with the points most often confused.
Where IEC 62443-3-3 sits in the series
The IEC 62443 series consists of four groups: general concepts (1-x), the asset owner’s security programme and policies (2-x), system-level requirements (3-x) and component/product development requirements (4-x). 3-3 defines the technical security requirements at system level and at which security level they are mandatory.
In the field, three documents are kept open together:
- IEC 62443-3-2: Risk assessment, the division of the system into zones and conduits, and the process of setting the target security level for each zone.
- IEC 62443-3-3: The technical capabilities a system must have for a zone to meet a given security level.
- IEC 62443-4-2: The same requirements broken down to individual components (PLC, HMI, switch, firewall, server software).
How to draw zones is described in the article the zone and conduit approach in IEC 62443; here we move on to the next step of that work, assigning levels.
The concepts of SL-T, SL-C and SL-A
The standard defines the security level according to the nature of the threat being protected against:
| Level | Threat protected against |
|---|---|
| SL 1 | Unintentional or casual violation |
| SL 2 | Intentional violation using simple means, low resources, generic skills and low motivation |
| SL 3 | Intentional violation using sophisticated means, moderate resources, IACS-specific skills and moderate motivation |
| SL 4 | Intentional violation using sophisticated means, extended resources, IACS-specific skills and high motivation |
The same scale is used in three different contexts. This is also what gets confused most often in meetings:
- SL-T (Target): The level required for a zone or conduit as a result of risk assessment. It is a decision; the asset owner makes it.
- SL-C (Capability): The level a system or component can provide when correctly configured. It is a property of the product or solution; the manufacturer or integrator declares it.
- SL-A (Achieved): The level the system installed and operated on site actually reaches. It is measured and changes over time. A service left enabled or a shared password stuck on a cabinet pulls the SL-A below the SL-C.
An SL is not a single number. It is a vector, each element of which corresponds to one of the seven foundational requirements: SL-T(Zone) = {FR1, FR2, FR3, FR4, FR5, FR6, FR7}. For example, for a control zone where confidentiality is of low importance and integrity of high importance, a target such as {2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2} says much more than a single “SL 2” label.
The seven foundational requirements (FR1–FR7)
| FR | Name | Typical counterpart in OT |
|---|---|---|
| FR1 | Identification and authentication control (IAC) | Personal accounts, MFA, device identity |
| FR2 | Use control (UC) | Role-based permissions, session lock, portable media |
| FR3 | System integrity (SI) | Software integrity, malware protection, input validation |
| FR4 | Data confidentiality (DC) | Encryption in transit and at rest |
| FR5 | Restricted data flow (RDF) | Segmentation, zone boundary protection |
| FR6 | Timely response to events (TRE) | Audit log access, continuous monitoring |
| FR7 | Resource availability (RA) | DoS resilience, backup, recovery |
In OT infrastructure, the FRs do not carry equal weight. On a filling line, the confidentiality of recipe data (FR4) is often a low priority; setpoint integrity (FR3) and line availability (FR7), on the other hand, have direct production and safety consequences. The vector approach is a way of putting this difference on paper.
How to read the SR and RE structure
Each FR is divided into numbered system requirements (SRs); each SR has a base requirement and optional requirement enhancements (REs). To reach an SL, the base requirement and all REs marked at that level must be met. If one is missing, the level is not achieved. Three examples are enough to show how to read it:
| Requirements | SL 1 | SL 2 | SL 3 | SL 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SR 1.1 Human user identification and authentication | Basic | + RE1 unique (per-person) identification | + RE2 MFA from untrusted networks | + RE3 MFA on all networks |
| SR 5.1 Network segmentation | Basic | + RE1 physical segmentation | + RE2 independence from non-control networks | + RE3 logical and physical isolation of critical networks |
| SR 5.2 Zone boundary protection | Basic | + RE1 deny by default, allow by exception | + RE2 island mode, RE3 fail close | Same |
Two practical conclusions follow from the table. First, an HMI using a “shared operator account” cannot meet SL 2 in FR1 because of SR 1.1 RE1; in the field, this is usually the first red line in a gap analysis. Second, SR 5.2 RE3 (fail close) calls into question the use of a bypass-capable firewall in a zone targeting SL 3; for the placement mode and bypass decision, see the article cell-level firewalls: transparent or routed. Some SRs are not required at all at SL 1; for example, continuous monitoring (SR 6.2) is mandatory from SL 2 upwards.
Steps for setting the SL-T for a zone
The standard does not give a ready-made formula from risk assessment to SL-T; IEC 62443-3-2 describes the process, and the asset owner defines the thresholds and matrices. The method that works in the field:
- Build the zone’s consequence profile. What happens if the systems in the zone are compromised or stop? Write down the worst realistic consequence under safety, environment, production loss, quality and legal obligations.
- Define the threat profile. Who can reach the zone, and through which conduit? A zone with an internet-connected remote access conduit and a zone with no external conduit do not have the same profile.
- Apply the organisation’s mapping matrix. Define a matrix that maps consequence severity and threat profile to an SL; there should be a single, approved matrix across the organisation. If each plant has its own matrix, the levels cannot be compared.
- Adjust per FR. Assess the overall level separately for each FR: for example, lowering FR4 in a zone where confidentiality does not matter, and raising FR3 and FR7 in a zone carrying a safety function.
- Assess conduits separately. A conduit’s SL-T must be able to carry the requirements of the higher of the zones it connects. A remote access conduit often requires a higher target than the zones themselves.
- Document and get approval. The SL-T vector, its justification and assumptions are written into the zone record and signed by the asset owner.
The security operations side of consequence and threat analysis is covered separately in the guide OT cybersecurity risk assessment.
Example gap analysis table against SL-C
Once the SL-T has been set, the SL-C of the system in the zone is determined per FR. The manufacturers’ declarations for the components (an IEC 62443-4-2 conformity statement or certificate, if any) show what the system can do. In an existing plant, it is useful to add to the same table a separate column with the estimated SL-A derived from the actual configuration on site: if a capability exists but is not used, the gap shows up in the SL-A. The table below is an example gap analysis for a packaging line cell:
| FR | SL-T | SL-C | Gap and measure |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR1 | 2 | 1 | Shared account on the HMI; move to personal accounts, or personal accounts on the jump server |
| FR2 | 2 | 1 | No role separation on the PLC; engineering access restricted to a single workstation |
| FR3 | 2 | 2 | No gap; PLC protection level kept enabled |
| FR4 | 1 | 1 | No gap |
| FR5 | 2 | 1 | Flat network; default-deny policy with a cell firewall |
| FR6 | 2 | 1 | Logs not collected; firewall and HMI logs sent to a central system |
| FR7 | 2 | 2 | No gap; PLC project backups are verified |
Every row of the gap table should turn into an action with an owner and a target date. The number of VLANs or the fact that a firewall has been installed does not, on its own, give a security level or a certification result; the SL-A is found by assessing that the requirements are met on site. Architectural options for gaps on the identity side are compared in the article a separate Active Directory for OT.
Compensating measures and their limits
Most PLCs in the field have a low SL-C in FR1 and FR2, and this cannot be fixed without replacing the product. IEC 62443-3-3 allows compensating measures in this situation: a requirement the component cannot meet is met by another control at zone or conduit level. Typical examples:
- Restricting access to a PLC without authentication to an MFA-protected jump server only, with a firewall rule.
- Recording the traffic of field devices that cannot generate logs through passive monitoring.
- Moving a server that cannot be patched into a separate sub-zone and opening it only to the necessary flows.
Write down their limits explicitly too. A compensating measure applied at the zone boundary provides no protection against a threat from inside the zone: someone with physical access to the cell, or a compromised HMI inside the cell, can still write to a PLC without authentication. That is why the SL-A achieved with a compensating measure is recorded together with its assumptions (for example “physical access to the cell cabinet is controlled”). A compensating measure is not a permanent solution. In the product renewal plan, choosing components with a sufficient SL-C must be written into the specification.
Checklist for maintaining SL-A over time:
- Does the zone record contain the SL-T vector, justification and approval date?
- Is an action, owner and target date defined for each gap?
- Are the assumptions of compensating measures written down and periodically verified?
- Are firewall rule, account and service changes assessed in the change process for their impact on SL-A?
- Does the target zone’s SL-T appear in the specification for new component purchases?
For the scope and current parts of the standard, the ISA/IEC 62443 series page is the primary source. To start zone and gap analysis from the field in an existing plant, see our factory OT infrastructure survey page, and for the implementation side, our OT cybersecurity and segmentation page.
Frequently asked questions
Can a zone’s SL-T be given as a single number?
It can as shorthand, but the standard’s approach is a vector made up of separate values for the seven foundational requirements. A single number can lead to unnecessary investment in a low-priority area such as confidentiality, and to insufficient protection in a critical area such as integrity.
Does a manufacturer’s SL 2-certified PLC automatically make the zone SL 2?
No. The certificate shows the component’s SL-C; the zone’s SL-A depends on how this component is configured on site, the other systems in the zone and operating practices. A shared password or a service left enabled lowers the SL-A.
Which plants is an SL 3 or SL 4 target suitable for?
These levels come into play in plants whose compromise could have safety, environmental or large-scale service disruption consequences and that are exposed to a targeted attacker profile. The decision is made with the organisation’s risk matrix and a concrete consequence analysis; it is not assigned automatically by looking at the industry.
Is reaching SL-T with compensating measures acceptable?
IEC 62443-3-3 allows compensating measures. But which requirement the measure meets, under which assumption, must be documented, and the protection it does not provide against threats from inside the zone must be explicitly recorded.