Factory OT Network Segmentation and On-Site Implementation
We inventory the cells, engineering workstations and external maintenance connections in the production network. We identify which systems need to reach each other and design network zones and access rules based on these flows.
Zone / conduit
What problem does this service solve?
Flat network
In a network where every device, from an office computer to a PLC, can reach every other, a single piece of malware or a faulty configuration can affect all of production.
Uncontrolled remote maintenance connections
Machine manufacturers’ own modems, permanent VPNs, remote desktop tools. No record is kept of who connected to which machine and when.
Systems that cannot be updated
HMIs and engineering workstations running an end-of-support operating system. If patching is not possible, compensating controls are needed.
An “any-any” rule table
There is a firewall, but the rules are wide open; nobody knows why a given rule is there.
What we cover, and within what limits
OT security works with different priorities from IT security: continuity and safety come first, devices stay in the field for many years and every change carries a production risk. We use the ISA/IEC 62443 series as a design reference. The series recommends dividing the system into zones, managing communication between zones through defined conduits, and setting the target security level of each zone through risk assessment. Within this framework, we design and implement the network architecture: access rules between zones (firewalls and access lists), network separation with VLANs, an OT DMZ, secure remote access and rule management. A VLAN tag on its own is not a security zone or access policy. We do not carry out independent conformity assessments or certification.
Technical scope
Asset and communication inventory
OT devices, communication flows and external connections are compiled from existing records and traffic observation; critical assets are identified. Zone design is based on this inventory.
Zone and conduit model
Definition of line, cell, engineering, safety system and OT DMZ zones; a list of permitted flows between zones.
Segmentation implementation
Phased implementation with VLANs, industrial/enterprise firewalls and access lists. Observation in monitoring mode first, then restriction.
OT DMZ
Placement of transition services such as a historian replica, patch/antivirus distribution server, file transfer and remote access jump server.
Secure remote maintenance
Supplier access passes through a single point: the connecting user is authorised, access time is limited and every connection is logged.
Rule management and monitoring
An owner, justification and periodic review for every rule; logs and alerts reaching the relevant team.
Reference zone structure
Zone
Example assets
Enterprise (IT)
Example assets
ERP, email, user computers
Typical rule approach
No direct access to OT; only to DMZ services
Example assets
Historian replica, patch server, jump server
Typical rule approach
IT and OT meet in this zone; no direct passage in either direction
Example assets
SCADA, MES clients, engineering workstations
Typical rule approach
Only to defined control zones and the DMZ
Example assets
PLCs, HMIs, remote I/O, drives
Typical rule approach
Free communication within the cell; only defined flows between cells
Example assets
Safety PLCs and related networks
Typical rule approach
Separate zone; changes with the safety officer’s approval
The zone structure is adapted to the site. Source: the zone/conduit approach of the ISA/IEC 62443 series and common reference architectures.
Prerequisites: what we need to get started
We list any gaps together in the first meeting and complete them during the survey.
- Plant network diagram and a list of existing security devices
- An OT asset list, or the possibility of passive monitoring for discovery
- A list of suppliers using remote access and their contract terms
- Planned downtime windows and the change approval process
- The opportunity for the IT security team and the automation team to work together
Deliverables
OT asset and communication flow inventory
Zone and conduit diagram
Firewall/VLAN rule set and its justifications
OT DMZ architecture document
Remote maintenance access procedure
Rule review and monitoring plan
Representative scenario: a plant where suppliers connect with their own modems
Several machine manufacturers connect to machines with their own modems or permanent remote desktop tools. First, these connections are inventoried. Then a move to multi-factor authenticated, time-limited and logged access through a jump point in the OT DMZ is planned; each supplier can reach only the zone where its own machine is located. Old connections are closed one by one after the new path has been tested.
This is a representative project flow; it is not a completed customer reference.
Service summary
IT/OT Integration Consulting
In a new machine, MES or energy monitoring project, we define who owns the network, the data and the access rules.
OT/ICS cybersecurity assessment ↗
Risk assessments, security testing and assessments within the scope of IEC 62443 are provided by siberguvenlik.eretek.com.
Scope limit
We do not carry out independent audits, conformity assessments or certification under IEC 62443. Safety instrumented systems (SIS) and functional safety (SIL) assessment are also out of scope. For comprehensive risk analysis, penetration testing and security monitoring, see the siberguvenlik.eretek.com pages.
How do we proceed?
No step that could affect production is carried out until the maintenance window, configuration backup and rollback plan are clear.
Discovery
Assets, flows and external connections are mapped.
Risk and model
Zones, conduits and priorities are defined.
Observation mode
Rules are first validated in monitoring mode.
Restriction
Traffic outside the permitted flows is closed off in phases.
Sustain
A rule review and monitoring routine is established.
Questions about OT Cybersecurity and Segmentation
Do you provide IEC 62443 certification?
No. Our service is a risk and architecture approach based on IEC 62443 principles; it is not an independent audit or official certification service.
Does segmentation stop production?
Changes on a live network can affect production. We first map the existing flows and validate the new rules in a pilot area. We apply migrations that may affect production in a maintenance window approved by the plant, with a rollback plan. If network zones and change records are to be used as evidence in an audit, we plan the control owners and the evidence to be presented separately as part of IT/OT audit preparation for production facilities.
Is a VLAN enough on its own?
A VLAN separates traffic logically but does not control access between zones. A firewall or access list is needed to restrict communication between zones with rules. A VLAN tag on its own does not count as a security zone or access policy.
What can be done for legacy systems that cannot be updated?
They are moved into a separate zone and only the necessary communication is allowed; USB and remote access are brought under control and monitoring is added. These are compensating measures; a replacement plan is prepared separately.
Work that can be planned together
IT/OT Integration Consulting
In a new machine, MES or energy monitoring project, we define who owns the network, the data and the access rules.
Industrial Ethernet and Factory Networks
We map switches, cables and connected devices from machine cabinets to the plant backbone.
Factory OT Infrastructure Discovery
Before any investment, we record on site which PLCs, switches, protocols and data flows are in use.
Knowledge Center
Technical guides for this service
Let's plan a technical survey for OT cybersecurity and network segmentation
Briefly describe the line, the PLC and network equipment you use and the problem you want to solve; we will respond with a written proposal covering scope, assumptions and deliverables.