Industrial Networks and OT · #91
Online OT Network Segment and Asset Inventory
Matches each device's IP address in the inventory to defined OT segments and finds inconsistencies.
- Data is processed in your browser and not sent to a server
- Export: XLSX, CSV
Tool
What does this tool do?
The first step in OT cyber security is an accurate asset inventory and knowing which zone (cell, SCADA, DMZ) each asset is in. The 'zone' column in the inventory often disagrees with the device's real IP; engineering workstations and temporary laptops move between segments. The tool matches devices only with the data you enter; it does not connect to the network or scan.
How to use it
- Enter zones one per line as
name;CIDR;Purdue level(level 0–5, 3.5 for DMZ). - Paste the asset CSV:
name, iprequired;type, zone, vendor, firmwareoptional. - Press Run; download the inventory and zone summary as XLSX.
Fields
- Zone / segment definitions
- name;CIDR;level — overlapping CIDRs are rejected.
- Asset list (CSV)
- Data is processed in the browser; no device is contacted.
Worked example
| Input | Value |
|---|---|
| Zone / segment definitions | |
| Asset list (CSV) | |
Expected result: EWS-01 is listed in the SCADA zone but its IP is in Hücre-1 (cell 1); CAM-07 uses the same IP as PLC-02; LAPTOP-X is in no defined OT segment. 3 devices in cell 1, 2 in cell 2.
The IP conflict causes intermittent communication loss in production and comes first. EWS-01 sitting directly in cell 1 may bypass the zone conduit; under IEC 62443 engineering stations belong in a separate, controlled zone.
Second scenario
| Input | Value |
|---|---|
| Zone / segment definitions | |
| Asset list (CSV) | |
Expected result: In IPv6 segments both assets match their defined zones; no findings.
Method and assumptions
Each asset's IP is compared with zone CIDRs (IPv4 and IPv6). Findings: same IP on several assets; inventory zone differs from the zone the IP falls into; IP falls into no zone; undefined zone name in the inventory. Overlapping CIDRs in zone definitions are an error.
Using the result and troubleshooting
Verify findings with the network team (switch ARP/MAC tables, passive monitoring). Check permissions between zones with the Firewall Rule Analyzer and tag lists with the PLC/SCADA comparison.
Limits and common mistakes
- No active discovery; devices missing from the list stay invisible. Firmware versions are not checked against vulnerability databases; VLAN, MAC and NAT data are not evaluated.
Frequently asked questions
What are the Purdue levels?
0 field devices, 1 control (PLC), 2 supervisory (HMI/SCADA), 3 operations (MES, historian), 3.5 IT/OT DMZ, 4–5 enterprise IT. IEC 62443 handles these layers with zones and conduits.
Related tools and service
- PLC and SCADA Tag List DiffShows the differences between two tag lists in one table for commissioning and revision checks.
- Subnet Overlap CheckerLists overlaps within the same VRF and deliberate reuse across VRFs separately.
Related service: OT Cyber Security and Segmentation