IT/OT Network Separation with the Purdue Model: A Practical Start

If production devices need to be reached from the office network, it must be defined who uses the flow, for which service and through which control point. Purdue levels, an industrial DMZ and a phased migration carried out in planned windows.
Technical summary
Technology
Purdue model, industrial DMZ, firewall, VLAN
Topic
IT/OT segmentation
Level
Intermediate
Prerequisites
  • OT device inventory
  • Joint work with production and maintenance teams
Related documentation
In this article8 sections

On the office side, a user opens an email attachment, malware starts spreading through file shares, and within a few hours it reaches the HMIs, engineering computers and SCADA servers on the same flat network. In many factories, office computers, PLCs, operator panels and cameras still run in a single broadcast domain. This structure may have worked without problems for years. Even so, nothing blocks the path from the office to the line.

IT/OT separation is the first step in managing this risk. The Purdue model provides a common language that lets the production, maintenance and IT teams look at the same map while drawing this separation. Below, we describe the model’s levels, what goes into the industrial DMZ, and a phased migration sequence carried out in planned windows.

The levels of the Purdue model

Level Content
Level 0 Sensors, actuators, the physical process in the field
Level 1 PLCs, RTUs, controllers
Level 2 HMIs, SCADA clients, line-level monitoring
Level 3 Site-level operations: SCADA servers, historians, MES components
Level 3.5 Industrial DMZ: the controlled transition area between IT and OT
Levels 4–5 Enterprise IT: ERP, email, office network, internet

When the Purdue model is used as a reference, the common design rule is this: no direct connection is made between the enterprise network and the control levels; data exchange takes place through services in the industrial DMZ. In practice, this means that a session coming from IT terminates in the DMZ, and the connection to OT is initiated from a separate system in the DMZ with separate credentials. For every rule opened directly from IT to Level 2, the justification, owner and control point must be written down.

Place the levels according to the real devices on site, not on paper. Even if an engineering computer physically sits in the office, it is a Level 2–3 asset because it programs PLCs. Left on the office network, it becomes the weakest link.

1. Start with the inventory

You cannot draw segments without knowing what is to be protected. PLCs, HMIs, drives, robots, engineering computers, cameras and network devices should be listed per line, together with IP addresses, firmware versions and responsible persons. Passive network monitoring tools help complete the inventory without sending packets to devices; the installation of the SPAN or TAP point from which traffic will be taken is planned separately.

A common mistake is trying to build the inventory with the active scanning tools IT is used to. The network stacks of old PLCs and some drives cannot withstand aggressive port scanning; the device may stop communicating or go into fault mode. The safer method is to listen to traffic from a SPAN (port mirroring) port on the switch or from a network TAP. This method is slower, but it does not send packets to devices.

Record not only devices with IP addresses in the inventory, but also temporary connections: the supplier’s service laptop, a 4G modem plugged into a cabinet, the machine builder’s remote access box. These devices often appear on no drawing and are back doors that bypass segmentation.

2. Map the traffic flows

Determine which system talks to which, over which protocol and port: the MES reading data from a PLC, the historian receiving data from SCADA, the engineering computer uploading a program to a PLC, and so on. This list is, in effect, the firewall rules you will write later.

For each flow, keep at least the following: source, destination, protocol and port, direction (who initiates the connection), frequency and operational owner. The “direction” column is usually skipped, yet it is what determines how tight the rules can be. The historian pulling data from SCADA and SCADA pushing data to the historian mean different rules.

Base the flow list on at least several weeks of observation. Month-end reports, recipe downloads at shift change and firmware updates done during annual maintenance do not fall into a short observation window. If these flows are missing from the first rule set, the related operation is blocked when the rule is put into force.

3. Set up the industrial DMZ

A firewall layer that can apply rules on both sides, together with a DMZ, is placed between IT and OT. This area typically contains:

  • A jump host for remote maintenance, with logged access
  • A historian or data transfer server (IT reads from here)
  • A distribution point for patches and antivirus updates
  • A controlled staging area for file transfers

For the DMZ to work, the services inside it must be “termination” points, not “relay” points. The reporting tool in IT does not connect directly to the historian in OT; it reads from the replica historian in the DMZ. A supplier doing remote maintenance does not go straight down to the PLC over VPN; they connect to the jump host in the DMZ with multi-factor authentication, the session is recorded, and from there they move on only to permitted targets.

If Active Directory is to be used in the DMZ, making it an extension of the corporate domain brings the risk that a corporate identity breach spreads into the DMZ and from there into OT. A separate identity domain or local accounts reduce this risk but increase the maintenance load; the choice is made according to the plant’s risk assessment.

On the firewall side, two separate devices (IT–DMZ and DMZ–OT) or separate interfaces and policy sets on a single device can be used. Whichever is chosen, it must be auditable that there is no rule going from IT to OT that bypasses the DMZ.

4. Cells and areas within OT

After IT/OT separation, OT itself should also be divided. Each production line or cell can be a separate segment, so that a problem on one line does not spread to the others. Traffic between cells is limited to the necessary flows only.

When drawing the cell boundary, look at functional dependency, not network topology. A PLC, HMI and robot that must work together stay in the same cell; two independent lines are separated. Keeping real-time communication (PROFINET RT, EtherNet/IP I/O) within the cell is a design requirement. Real-time traffic that runs at layer 2, such as PROFINET RT, is not routed; passing real-time traffic through a firewall can introduce latency and jitter.

The choice of layer 3 switch or firewall to route between cells is made accordingly. A simple access control list (ACL) is enough for separation with a few rules; if protocol awareness and logging are needed, an industrial firewall is required. Defining these boundaries with the zone and conduit approach of IEC 62443 makes it easier to document why decisions were made.

5. Phased migration

  • The firewall is first put into service in monitor-and-log mode only.
  • Unexpected flows are clarified by reviewing the logs.
  • Rules are applied line by line in planned downtime windows.
  • Every step has a rollback plan and the production team’s approval.

An “allow everything and log” rule is placed at the end of the rule set in monitoring mode. After a few weeks, the traffic hitting this rule is reviewed: either it is a known flow and gets its own rule, or it is an unexpected connection and its source is tracked down. When traffic hitting this last rule approaches zero, the rule is changed to “deny and log”.

The rollback plan must be concrete: which rule is rolled back, on whose authority and within how many minutes, and on which HMI screen communication is confirmed to be back. “We’ll look into it if there’s a problem” is not a plan. During the downtime window, a maintenance technician should be at the line and the network lead at the firewall console, together.

Common mistakes

  • Port forwards opened directly to a PLC for remote maintenance
  • OT and IT managed in the same Active Directory domain, with the same privileges
  • “Allow everything” rules written without inventory and flow analysis
  • Treating segmentation as a one-off project; not setting up change management
  • Separating with VLANs but leaving routing between VLANs unrestricted on the corporate core switch
  • Forgetting connections outside the inventory, such as a 4G modem in a cabinet or a supplier’s remote access box

VLAN separation on its own is not a security boundary. If routing between VLANs is done without applying rules, the network is still logically flat. If production devices need to be reached from the office network, it must be defined who uses the flow, for which service and through which control point. That access really is restricted is verified with a test approved by the plant and from the firewall logs. If network zones and data flows need to be shown in an audit, identify control owners and evidence with IT/OT compliance consulting for production facilities.

When planning this separation in your factory network, the switch and cabling side also needs to be addressed; the industrial switch selection guide covers hardware decisions at the cell level.

Frequently asked questions

Is the Purdue model a standard?

No, the Purdue model is a reference architecture; it divides industrial systems into levels according to their function. For security requirements, it is usually used together with standards such as IEC 62443.

Does segmentation stop production?

Changes on a live network can affect production. We first map the existing flows and validate the new rules in a pilot area. We apply migrations that may affect production in a maintenance window approved by the plant, with a rollback plan.

Should the OT network never reach the internet?

Ideally, OT levels should not reach the internet directly. Needs such as remote maintenance and updates should be met through controlled services in the industrial DMZ.

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PLC, PROFINET/PROFIBUS and SCADA communication, IT/OT network segmentation and industrial field connectivity. We install and monitor without stopping the production line.

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