Looking at a factory’s network drawing, you usually see switches, VLAN numbers and IP blocks. You do not see how much protection each system needs, why each connection is open or who is responsible. That is why firewall rules pile up over the years; nobody knows which ones can be deleted.
IEC 62443 is the international family of standards for the cybersecurity of industrial automation and control systems. Its scope is broad; however, one of its core ideas is this: divide the system into groups with the same security requirements (zones) and define and control the communication paths between these groups (conduits). Zone and conduit design and risk assessment are mainly covered in IEC 62443-3-2, while system-level security requirements and security levels are covered in IEC 62443-3-3.
What is a zone?
A zone is a logical group of assets that share the same security requirements. For example, the PLCs and HMIs of a production line could be one zone, the site-level SCADA and historian servers another, and the remote maintenance infrastructure a separate zone. Zone boundaries are drawn according to risk and functional dependency, not according to network devices.
A zone definition does not end with an asset list. For each zone, at least the following should be written down: the purpose of the zone, the assets in it, the responsible team, the target security level, its physical and logical boundary, and the conduits entering and leaving the zone. This table is the document that explains why the firewall rule set is written the way it is. Without the document, the rule set cannot be defended either.
A common mistake is equating a zone with a VLAN. A VLAN is one of the tools for implementing the zone decision on the network; on its own it is not a security zone or access policy. Two lines in the same zone may be in different VLANs, and devices with different risk levels may have been forgotten inside one VLAN. The zone is drawn first, then the network is configured accordingly.
What is a conduit?
A conduit is a communication path between zones. For each conduit, it is defined which data flows, with which protocol, in which direction and initiated by whom; the protection to be applied on the conduit (firewall rule, encryption, authentication, logging) is determined. Every undefined connection is an uncontrolled risk.
A conduit is not just a cable or a firewall rule. A supplier’s remote access tunnel, the laptop an engineer plugs into the line, the USB stick used to transfer recipes and a wireless bridge are also conduits. Unless these are added to the drawing, the security assessment stays on paper. Once the flows between cells are defined, verify the access rules and their limits in an IT/OT security segmentation and access control engagement.
A practical starting plan
1. Define the scope and inventory
Draw the boundary of the system to be assessed: one line, one plant or all of production. List the assets in scope, network connections and external connections (remote access, cloud, supplier connections).
Covering the whole plant in the first exercise often stalls the work. Starting with a single line or a single section of the plant is faster for establishing the method. Avoid active scanning when building the inventory; older controllers may not be able to withstand it. Passive monitoring and existing project files are safer sources. For a practical starting sequence, see the article IT/OT network separation with the Purdue model.
2. High-level risk assessment
Assess the possible consequences of the system being harmed in terms of human safety, the environment, production loss and reputation. This assessment determines which parts are protected more tightly.
A detailed threat model is not needed at this stage. The question is simple: what is the worst that can happen if this system is compromised or stops? A packaging line and a chemical dosing system do not give the same answer. The answers should be given together with the production, maintenance and occupational health and safety leads; the IT team alone cannot know the physical consequences of the process.
3. Draw the zones and conduits
- Safety-critical systems (e.g. safety systems) are kept in separate zones.
- Systems with different responsibility and management models are separated.
- Enterprise IT and internet connections are kept separate from OT zones; the transition between them goes through the DMZ zone.
- Temporary connections (laptops, USB, supplier access) are also treated as conduits.
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) need special attention. If placed in the same zone as the control system, a breach on the control side could also affect the safety function. The aim is for the SIS to be in its own zone, connected to the control system only through a defined and limited conduit.
4. Set the target security level
The standard defines security levels (SL) according to the capability of the threat expected to be resisted. For each zone and conduit, a target level (SL-T) is set according to the risk assessment in IEC 62443-3-2; the gap between the current state and the target makes up the list of work to be done.
- SL 1: Unintentional or casual violation
- SL 2: Intentional attack using simple means and generic knowledge
- SL 3: Attack using sophisticated means and knowledge specific to industrial systems
- SL 4: Sophisticated, targeted attack with extensive resources
The standard distinguishes three concepts: the target level (SL-T), the level that components or the system can provide (SL-C) and the level actually achieved on site (SL-A). A common confusion is believing that buying a product with a high SL-C automatically raises the SL-A. The product provides the capability; the achieved level is determined by configuration and operation. The number of VLANs or the fact that a firewall has been installed does not, on its own, give a security level or a certification result either.
5. Implement and maintain the measures
Rules on conduits, access management, patching and backup processes, monitoring and incident response are planned according to the target level. The zone and conduit model is not a one-off drawing; it must be updated when a new machine, a new connection or a new supplier arrives.
The practical way to maintain it is to add a single question to change management: does this change bring a new asset or a new conduit? If the answer is yes, no rule is written until the zone document is updated. Adding a conduit number or description to firewall rules makes rule cleanup possible years later. For the security features of the network hardware within a zone, the article industrial switch selection offers guidance.
Practical notes from the field
- Don’t aim for a complete model in the first exercise; start with a small number of clearly bounded zones and build from there.
- Involve the production, maintenance and IT teams in drawing the zones together.
- Assign a responsible person to each conduit.
- Move remote maintenance conduits to a setup that is opened on demand and logged, rather than always on.
- Don’t skip the “direction” information in conduit definitions; who initiates the connection determines how tight the rule is.
The texts of the standards and the current list of parts are available from ISA and IEC.
Frequently asked questions
Are a zone and a VLAN the same thing?
No. A zone is a logical group of assets that share the same security requirements. A zone can be implemented with one or more VLANs; but it is risk and security requirements, not network structure, that define the zone.
Should every factory aim for the highest security level?
No. The target security level is set per zone according to the risk assessment. Applying the highest level to every zone can bring unnecessary cost and operational burden.
Is IEC 62443 certification mandatory?
It depends on the industry and customer requirements. Even if certification is not the goal, the zone and conduit approach is a useful framework for planning OT security in an orderly way.