SCADA servers, historians, engineering workstations and operator panels need central authentication at some point. In most plants, this need is met the quickest way: the machines join the corporate Active Directory domain. It works, until a domain admin account is compromised in IT. Below, we compare three identity options for OT (joining the IT domain, a separate OT forest, local accounts) and, for the separate-forest design, describe domain controller placement, DNS, time, GPO scope and the trust decision. Hardening the corporate AD is a separate topic.
Identity infrastructure options in OT
There are three basic models. Most plants have settled into one of them, usually without a conscious decision:
- Joining the IT domain: OT systems are members of the corporate domain; users log on with their corporate accounts, and GPOs come from the corporate structure.
- A separate OT forest: An independent Active Directory forest with its own domain controllers is set up on the OT side, at Level 3. There is either no trust with IT at all, or a limited trust.
- Local accounts (workgroup): Each system works with its own local accounts. This is common in small installations and single-purpose panels.
The right choice depends on the number of Windows systems in the OT infrastructure, the structure supported by the SCADA vendor, the OT team’s competence in running AD and whether there is a DMZ between IT and OT. For the Purdue levels and the general logic of IT/OT separation, see the article IT/OT network separation with the Purdue model.
Risks and conveniences of joining the IT domain
Joining the IT domain looks attractive: one account, one password, ready-made patch and antivirus infrastructure, central auditing. The cost is that the OT security boundary in effect extends all the way to the boundary of the corporate domain.
Concrete risks:
- Carry-over of identity breaches: A domain admin account compromised in IT is also an administrator on OT systems. Ransomware operators spreading to all domain members via GPOs or remote management tools after obtaining domain admin rights is a known attack technique. The domain knows no boundaries.
- Wide openings in the firewall: For member servers in OT to reach the domain controllers in IT, many ports, including Kerberos, LDAP, SMB and the RPC dynamic port range, need to be opened between IT and OT. This breaks the “no direct sessions” principle of the DMZ. The broad permissions we see most often in IT–OT rule bases in the field also stem from this need.
- GPO effects: Corporate screen lock, automatic restart, software distribution or security agent policies cause unexpected results on operator panels. An HMI that restarts at midnight is downtime nobody planned.
- Dependency: An outage on the IT network or WAN can affect logons in OT and the licence/service validation of some applications.
The conveniences are real, but they can largely be provided with a separate forest too. Keeping an existing domain membership can only be defended with a conscious risk acceptance and strict compensating measures: separate OT admin accounts, denying IT administrators logon to OT systems, and a separate OU and GPO chain for OT.
Designing a separate OT forest
The key design decisions for a separate forest:
- Forest and domain name: Choose a name under a registered domain owned by the organisation that does not overlap with the IT forest. A name that looks like a subdomain of the IT domain (
ot.corp.example.com.trwhen the IT domain iscorp.example.com.tr) can cause confusion and misrouting in DNS; a separate name is cleaner. - Domain controllers: At least two DCs, at Level 3, on different physical servers or different virtualisation hosts. Two DCs on the same host are a single point of failure. In this design, DCs are not placed in the DMZ. In large plants, a DC per production area can be considered; but every DC means extra maintenance.
- Single domain: More than one domain is rarely needed in the OT forest. Separation is done with the OU structure and delegation.
- Administrator model: Administrators of the OT forest use separate accounts; these accounts do not exist in the IT forest. Administration is done only from management workstations in OT.
- Backup: The System State backup is taken to the backup infrastructure inside OT. Keeping the backup on a backup server joined to the IT domain defeats the separation.
The first DC of the new forest can be installed with PowerShell as follows (the name and NetBIOS name are examples):
Install-WindowsFeature AD-Domain-Services -IncludeManagementTools
Install-ADDSForest -DomainName "otnet.example.com.tr" -DomainNetbiosName "OTNET" `
-InstallDns -SafeModeAdministratorPassword (Read-Host -AsSecureString "DSRM password")
Before choosing the forest and domain functional level, check the operating systems and AD structure supported by the SCADA, historian and engineering software vendors. Some vendors require a specific installation order (DC first, then the application server) or a particular service account structure. Finding this out after installation means doing the installation twice.
To trust or not to trust
As soon as the separate forest is set up, the first request arrives: “Let IT users access OT reports with their own accounts.” Before setting up a trust, ask this question: why does this access have to reach into OT? The reporting need is often met through the historian replica or a reporting server in the DMZ, and that server can be managed by IT with its own identity infrastructure. The details of this placement are in the article OT DMZ design.
If a trust is unavoidable, the following limits are applied:
- Direction: The trust direction determines which side’s accounts can access resources on the other side. If the OT forest trusts IT, IT accounts can access OT resources; the reverse opens IT resources to OT accounts. Clarify the direction that is really needed and set up a one-way trust in that direction only.
- Selective authentication: The trust should not give automatic access to every server on the resource side; access should only be possible to servers granted the “Allowed to Authenticate” permission.
- SID filtering: Enabled by default on forest trusts. It is not turned off.
- Network openings: The ports needed for the trust are opened only between the DCs of the two forests; they are not opened as a general IT–OT permission.
To review the trust status regularly, check the direction (Direction), selective authentication and SID filtering fields in the output of Get-ADTrust -Filter *. A trust that was correct on the day it was set up can turn into an exception nobody remembers two years later.
DNS, time synchronisation and GPO scope
DNS: The OT forest’s DNS zones are kept on the OT DCs, AD-integrated. OT clients use only the OT DNS servers. Most OT systems do not need to resolve internet names; if they do, conditional forwarding to a resolver in the DMZ is used. If IT names are needed, a conditional forwarder is defined for the relevant zone only. A common mistake: leaving a server in IT as the secondary DNS on OT clients. The moment the primary does not respond, the client goes to IT.
Time: Kerberos is sensitive to the clock difference between client and DC; the default tolerance is 5 minutes. In addition, all of OT needs a consistent time source so that alarm and event logs can be ordered. The DC holding the PDC emulator role in the forest root domain is configured to take time from the NTP server in the DMZ or from a GPS-based source inside OT:
w32tm /config /manualpeerlist:"10.20.0.5,0x8 10.20.0.6,0x8" /syncfromflags:manual /reliable:yes /update
w32tm /query /status
Other DCs and member servers take time from the default domain hierarchy. Non-Windows devices such as PLCs and industrial switches are also pointed to the same OT NTP source. If clocks drift, sessions drop first, then the logs become meaningless.
GPO scope: Instead of copying the corporate security baseline as it is, create separate OUs by system role: servers, engineering workstations, operator panels, service accounts. On operator panels, screen lock and automatic restart are set according to process needs; instead of automatic installation, Windows Update is tied to the WSUS in OT and to the change window. Application allow-listing (AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control) is more practical in OT than in IT, because the software inventory is static.
Comparison table of the options
| Criterion | IT domain | Separate OT forest | Local accounts |
|---|---|---|---|
| Impact of an IT breach on OT | Direct | Limited (none without a trust) | Limited |
| IT–OT firewall openings | Wide (AD ports) | None, or only between DCs | None |
| Central management | Yes | Yes | None |
| Operating burden | Low | Medium (DC maintenance, backups) | Grows with the number of systems |
| Suitable scale | Depends on the risk assessment; not preferred in most OT designs | Medium and large OT | Small number of systems |
As long as the OT forest stays self-contained, the firewall rules needed for AD ports are written not at the IT–OT boundary but between zones inside OT: Kerberos (88), Kerberos password change (464), LDAP (389), LDAPS (636), Global Catalog (3268/3269), DNS (53), SMB (445), RPC endpoint mapper (135) and the RPC dynamic range (49152–65535 by default on Windows Server). For the detailed list, Microsoft’s Active Directory Domain Services documentation is the reference. The RPC dynamic range is wide; that is why restricting source and destination to the DCs in inter-zone rules is essential.
Migration steps
Moving OT systems that are members of the IT domain to a separate forest means a domain change, and therefore a restart, on every system. The migration is therefore planned with change window discipline (change window engineering in OT).
- Inventory: List all OT systems that are members of the IT domain, the service accounts they use and which application each account is defined in. A forgotten service account comes back as a service that stops after the move.
- Vendor check: Obtain the domain change procedure from the SCADA and historian vendors; some applications require reconfiguration when a service account or certificate changes.
- Build the OT forest: Two DCs, DNS, time, the OU and GPO structure, backups.
- Recreate service accounts: Use gMSAs (group Managed Service Accounts) where possible; if the application does not support them, create accounts with strong passwords and only the rights they need.
- Pilot: Start with an engineering workstation or a server with low production impact.
- Line-by-line migration: Each move in a change window; move on to the next system after application functions and logon tests have passed.
- Closing out: Once all systems have been moved, close the AD ports between IT and OT, and disable and clean up the OT computer accounts remaining in the IT domain. If the ports stay open, the migration is only half done.
Tiering administrator accounts on the corporate side completes the OT separation; the topic is covered in the guide the Active Directory tier model. To plan the OT identity architecture together with segmentation, see our OT cybersecurity and segmentation and IT/OT integration consulting pages. To see the health of the existing directory before deciding on separation, an Active Directory security audit can be carried out.
Frequently asked questions
Is a separate OT forest an excessive investment for a small plant?
If there are few domain-joined OT systems and the number of users is limited to a few people, centrally managed local accounts and strict password management may be enough temporarily. As SCADA clients, historians and engineering workstations multiply, managing local accounts becomes difficult; at that point, a small OT forest with two domain controllers is usually more manageable and more secure.
Is setting up a trust between the OT forest and the IT forest completely wrong?
It is not wrong, but it gives back part of the protection the separation provides. If a trust is unavoidable, a one-way structure in which the OT forest trusts IT is set up, restricted to selected resources only with selective authentication, and ports are opened only between the relevant domain controllers. In most scenarios, intermediary systems in the DMZ and separate OT accounts are a cleaner solution than a trust.
Can an OT domain controller sit in the DMZ?
It should not. The OT forest’s domain controllers are on the OT side, at Level 3. If servers in the DMZ are made members of the OT forest, authentication traffic has to be opened from the DMZ to the OT domain controllers; this weakens the purpose of the DMZ. For the DMZ, local accounts or a separate, small DMZ identity structure are preferred.
Can OT users use their IT passwords in OT too?
It is technically possible with password synchronisation tools, but not recommended. If the same password is valid in both environments, credentials stolen in IT also work in OT. OT accounts should be separate; multi-factor authentication should be applied at least at the entry point to OT, i.e. at the remote access intermediary in the DMZ.